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INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMITTEES:
PROCEED WITH CAUTION
JONATHAN D. MORENO*
INTRODUCTION
I come as a friendly critic of ethics committees. Indeed, as one
who has been a member of several ethics committees and has con-
sulted for a number of others, I am in no position now to disassoci-
ate myself from this fascinating phenomenon, nor do I wish to do
so. But I do want to introduce a series of cautionary notes. In gen-
eral I hold the following to be the case about ethics committees:
They are poorly understood; their historical precursors should give
us pause; they are subject to the usual problems of bureaucratic en-
tities called committees; and if mandated by legislation, their
strengths are likely to be undermined.
I. UNDERSTANDING ETHICS COMMITTEES
Ethics committees are poorly understood in two senses: there
is widespread misunderstanding about them, and it is not clear what
it would mean to understand them correctly. Partly this is because
ethics committees were born in ambiguity. The term "ethics com-
mittee" was first used in its current meaning by a doctor in an article
that attracted little attention at the time.' It was picked up and ap-
plied erroneously by the justices in In re Quinlan2 who were evidently
referring to prognosis review.' Conversely, when promulgating its
"Baby Doe" guidelines in the early 1980s, the Department of Health
and Human Services piggy-backed on the concept, eschewed "qual-
ity of life decision-making," and changed the name, preferring the
more innocuous "infant care review committee." 4 With this history
* Ph.D., Professor of Pediatrics and Medicine and Director of the Division of Hu-
manities in Medicine, State University of New York Health Science Center at Brooklyn,
New York. I am grateful to Gail Povar, M.D., for comments on a previous draft.
1. See Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What the Law Should Be, 27 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 6 (1975).
2. 70 N.J. 10, 49-51, 355 A.2d 647, 688-69, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
3. See id. at 51, 355 A.2d 647, 649; see alsoJ. Ross, HANDBOOK FOR HOSPITAL ETHICS
COMMITrEES 6 (1986).
4. See Procedures Relating to Health Care for Handicapped Infants, 45 C.F.R.
§ 84.55 (1984). For an overview of the issues related to the "Baby Doe Rule," see gen-
erally Moreno, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Care of the Imperiled Newborn, 14 CLINICS IN
PERINATOLOGY 345 (1987).
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it is no wonder that the decade-old ethics committee movement is
still trying to figure out what it is about. As Alex Capron has re-
cently pointed out, if ethics committees are to give incompetent pa-
tients the protection some courts want them to, judges must give
them substantive instruction about what counts as "reasonable"
procedures for them to follow.
5
I imagine that that comic wordmaster George Carlin would
have a field day with the term "ethics committee." If we need com-
mittees to tell us right from wrong, some might say, we are in real
trouble. Still, if we have learned anything from modern medical
ethics, it is that good and well-informed people may differ on spe-
cific occasions of ethical choice. Perhaps if we get these people to-
gether around the same table they can reach a consensus. But then
what is the moral significance of their consensus? Isn't the great
lesson of the twentieth century that moral consensus can lead to dis-
astrous inhumanity?6 That about which we agree is not necessarily
that about which we ought to agree, as Plato took pains to point
out.7 Imagine we leap this profound and largely ignored philosoph-
ical hurdle. I believe we may do so by developing sophisticated ar-
guments that refer to Aristotle's concept of "practical wisdom'' or
John Dewey's concept of "social intelligence." 9 On the whole, how-
ever, we lack a coherent theoretical framework that could provide a
philosophical foundation for ethics committees.'
Perhaps the very use of the term "ethics" is gratuitous in this
context. In my experience, these committees most often search for
an accommodation among conflicting claims, using as guidelines
general ideas such as respecting the wishes of the patient. (Fortu-
nately), their deliberations resemble an Oxford seminar on moral
philosophy far less than they do a clinical case conference. Their
discussions not only involve moral questions, but also administra-
tive procedures and legal opinions." On the whole, it is hard to tell
why they might not just as well be called "clinical dispute resolution
committees."
5. See Capron, The Burden of Decision, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1990, at 36, 41.
6. See infra text accompanying note 16.
7. See PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 221-34 (Cornford trans. 1941).
8. See INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE 304 (R. McKeon ed. 1947).
9. SeeJ. DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 69 (1963).
10. See generally Moreno, Ethics by Committee: The Moral Authority of Consensus, 13 J.
MED. & PHIL. 411 (1988); Moreno, What Means This Consensus? Ethics Committees and Philo-
sophic Tradition, I J. CLINICAL ETHICS 1, 38 (1990).
11. See Macklin, The Inner Workings of an Ethics Committee: Latest Battle over Jehovah's
Witnesses, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 15.
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Part of our problem is a dreadful lack of information about the
activities of these committees, the backgrounds of their members,
and the rules governing their functioning. Knowing little about how
they are similar or different from one institution to another, it is
hard to formulate reasonable standards of quality. What counts as
an excellent ethics committee? One that is called upon for case re-
view frequently or infrequently? One that is highly visible in the
institution or one that works behind the scenes? One that takes
clear positions and offers advice freely to staff physicians or one that
prefers to remain neutral and assist in a negotiated settlement? One
that is viewed by health care providers as friendly and supportive of
their problems or one that is seen by patients as friendly and sup-
portive of their problems?
For the most part, existing literature fails to ask or answer these
questions; perhaps some of them are not even all that important.
But even more fundamental areas of uncertainty persist. For exam-
ple, why is multidisciplinary representation so important? Accord-
ing to what criteria should members be chosen? Should all
members have access to the patient's name and records, even if the
patient declines to have his or her case heard by the committee?
Does admission to a hospital imply willingness to receive the minis-
trations of the ethics committee? The ethics committee has an obli-
gation to be concerned about the well-being of many parties: the
patient, the institution, the medical staff, the community, and
others. How are these obligations to be balanced? Surely no ethics
committee properly-so-called can avoid this question.
About ethics committees, little is known and less is understood;
Professor Hoffmann's study is an enormous service.1 3 I have not
even addressed the confusion and resentment ethics committees
elicit among many physicians, who have been brought up to think of
"good doctors" as those who are both technically proficient and
morally virtuous. Legal mandate will not necessarily engender more
cooperation from that quarter, and could even drive problems un-
derground. But I am getting ahead of my story.
12. But see Povar, Evaluating Ethics Committees: What Do We Mean by Success?, 50 MD. L.
REV. 904 (1991).
13. See Hoffmann, Does Legislating Hospital Ethics Committees Make a Difference?:
A Study of Hospital Ethics Committees in Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Vir-
ginia (1991) (to be published in a forthcoming issue of Law, Medicine & Health Care)
(unpublished manuscript on file with Maryland Law Review).
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II. THEIR ANCESTORS
The historical precursors of ethics committees should give us
pause. I believe it was Voltaire who once said facetiously, "Every-
one up to the present generation was an idiot." We do have an an-
noying tendency to denigrate our antecedents as quaint and
amusing, when we are not absurdly promoting them to superhuman
status. When an ethics committee insists that the patient's voice
must be heard and respected, that seems right to me. How will that
seem twenty-five years from now? Twenty-five years ago, well-
meaning people in places like New York and Seattle decided who
should have access to kidney dialysis when the machines were new
and in short supply.' 4 Even they came to see their inclination to-
ward middle-class patients with backgrounds similar to theirs as
troubling.' 5 Ninety years ago and less, groups of physicians se-
lected some mentally disabled women as appropriate candidates for
abortion, as part of an American eugenics movement with broad
popular support that informed Adolph Hitler's Mein Kampf.16
But, of course, proponents of ethics committees will reply in-
dignantly that it is just such experiences that gave rise to modern
bioethics. The horrors of institutionalized genocide warrant the es-
tablishment of ethics committees as well as institutional review
boards, to protect the individual.' 7 But I maintain that an appar-
ently trivial new element in a situation can result in an imperceptible
shift in self-awareness. The tragedy is that we might not be cogni-
zant of what has happened to us until much later. For example, the
over-full intensive care units in our large urban hospitals encourage
us to find alternative arrangements, including limiting treatment,
for those unlikely to benefit from intensive medicine. On the whole
this seems to me a sensible and even overdue approach, but in the
future, this solution to the problem of overcrowding may be charac-
terized as moral blindness.
Nevertheless, the fact remains that under conditions of uncer-
tainty, health care professionals, and physicians in particular, fre-
quently must make decisions that will not wait for the wisdom of the
ages. My argument here does not advocate ethical relativism, but
14. For a discussion of the Seattle selection committee, see Alexander, They Decide
Who Lives, Who Dies, LIFE, Nov. 9, 1962, at 102.
15. See id. at 127.
16. For a discussion of the American eugenics movement and its relation to Nazism,
see RJ. LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS (1986).
17. See Fletcher, The Bioethics Movement and Hospital Ethics Committees, 50 MD. L. REV.
859 (1991).
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provides a reminder that collective moral perception is far from
foolproof. There is no refuge in the defense that ethics committee
decisions are merely advisory: given the right political arena, advice
can be difficult to ignore.
III. BUREAUCRACY
Ethics committees are subject to the usual problems of bureau-
cratic entities called committees. Clearly no moral invulnerability is
conferred upon ethics committees simply by virtue of the name be-
stowed upon them. Institutional politics and the intricacies of small
group relations cannot be barred at the door of the conference
room. Committee membership will not be sought only by those
with a deep interest in the scholarly literature of medical ethics and
an abiding commitment to the promotion of autonomy. Some who
are motivated by unvarnished self-interest will seek to join, mainly
to ensure that they know whose ox is being gored. Others will long
for the halcyon "good old days" when doctors gave orders for the
good of patients, and patients did not come to the consulting room
with a lawyer's business card in their pockets. These people will
want a role, not because they are venal, but because of skepticism
about this patient self-determination business. Still others will be
neither self-interested nor curmudgeonly, but simply clumsy, self-
righteous, or both.
In our institutional life we tolerate all of these inadequacies in
the committee system. Why should we expect ethics committees to
be any different? The answer is that ethics committees are likely to
be subject to a higher level of scrutiny than other functional bureau-
cratic agencies in a health care organization, or at least they should
be held to a higher standard. Cynicism and idealism already co-
exist uneasily in modern hospitals. Although they represent diver-
gent attitudes toward public life, they are separated by a fine line.
An ethics committee that is perceived within the institution's rank-
and-file as anything but an exemplar ofjudiciousness and probity is
likely to be a greater liability than is the absence of an ethics
committee.
Some bioethical writers have urged that ethics consultants may
provide a superior solution to the problems that give rise to the cre-
ation of ethics committees.is As individuals, ethics consultants can-
not so easily hide behind the veil of consensus, and they can be
18. See Ackerman, Conceptualizing the Role of the Ethics Consultant: Some Theoretical Issues,
in ETHics CONSULTATION IN HEALTH CARE (J. Fletcher, N. Quist & A. Jonsen eds. 1989);
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expected to be truly expert in the growing literature of the field.
The main advantage of the ethics consultant is greater accountabil-
ity, but I am afraid that we know nearly as little about what the ethics
consultant should be doing as about what the ethics committee
should be doing. Further, there are probably fewer competent eth-
ics consultants around than there are admirable ethics committees.
Finally, the danger that physicians will be tempted to pass off every
touchy situation to the hospital ethicists may be greater than if the
alternative is the more formidable process of committee review.
If I am correct that ethics committees will, or at least should be,
held to a higher standard than other committees in the health care
organization, we must start to pay attention to the quality of ethics
committee deliberation. This is especially important for those com-
mittees that are staffed largely by busy clinicians, to whom one hour
a month is a substantial commitment. In trying to enhance the qual-
ity of committee functioning, we should refer not only to writings
and principles in bioethics and health law, but also to the contribu-
tions of social psychology and management theory professionals.
These are the people who know something about small group be-
havior and integrating the official role of an authorized committee
into the dynamic everyday life of the institution.
For example, socio-psychological evidence suggests that the
quality of consensus decisionmaking can be improved if certain sim-
ple procedural rules are followed.' 9 What is called in that literature
a "vigilant" decisionmaking strategy2" includes the following steps:
Obtain as much information as possible about the alternatives; thor-
oughly discuss the value of each alternative; after evaluating the al-
ternatives, rank them according to the most and least desirable; if
there is an unranked middle-range of alternatives, discuss and rank
them; and systematically reconsider the rank assigned to each alter-
native, without hesitating to change a rank if that is warranted.
Clearly this sort of systematic procedure would have to be adapted
to fit the unique role of the ethics committee. For instance, one al-
ternative the committee will want to consider from time to time is
that of giving no advice at all.
It is worth noting that the potential contributions of the social
sciences to ethics committees are appreciated in other parts of the
Ackerman, Moral Problems, Moral Inquiry, and Consultation in Clinical Ethics, in CLINICAL
ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE (B. Hoffmaster, B. Freedman & G. Fraser eds. 1989).
19. See Hirokawa, Does Consensus Really Result in Higher Quality Group Decisions?, in
EMERGENT ISSUES IN HUMAN DECISION MAKING (G. Phillips &J. Wood eds. 1984).
20. See id. at 41.
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world. In Argentina's most important center for medical humani-
ties, the Mainetti Foundation, role playing is used to train new mem-
bers of ethics committees throughout South America.2 Applied
social science can be a powerful ally of applied ethics.
IV. LEGISLATING ETHICS COMMITrEES
If mandated by legislation, the strengths of ethics committees
are likely to be undermined. In light of the foregoing discussion,
the reader may be surprised to learn that I think ethics committees
do have strengths. In my experience, these committees tend to
function best when, among other conditions, they emerge from the
felt needs of the professional staff. A related factor is that the very
ambiguity inherent in the role of such a committee can work to its
advantage. I believe that, paradoxically, the relative clarity of role
that follows from the external imposition on the institution of a par-
ticular committee structure gives the ethics committee less room to
manuever, and stirs up the sorts of anxieties that commonly greet
new regulation of the health care system.
The most important feature of the ethics committee idea is that
hospitals increasingly are prepared to recognize that moral ques-
tions are part of the very tissue of modern health care. Though
partly prodded by fear of lawsuits, our health care institutions
largely have come to this recognition for sound intellectual reasons.
My greatest concern is that legally mandated ethics committees will
be seen as yet another instance of state intervention backed up by
the attorney general's office, or as an extension of risk management.
In my experience, Americans are unable to appreciate the distinc-
tion between the legal and the ethical, and such regulatory require-
ments do not help to sharpen the distinction in the public mind.
From this point of view, proposed federal requirements tied to
Medicare would present additional dangers.2 2 Surveys indicate that
Americans, especially elderly Americans, are deeply suspicious of
the motives of health care providers, and are highly sensitive to ex-
plicit government efforts to limit treatment.2" Even if ethics com-
21. See Centro Oncol6gico de Excelencia, Hospital Ethics Committees, Course 1
(Sept. 21-23, 1989) (pamphlet describing hospital ethics committee coordinator training
course) (copy on file with Maryland Law Review).
22. See Kinney, Setting Limits: A Realistic Assignment for the Medicare Program?, 33 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 631 (1989).
23. See generally AARP Research & Data Resources Department, Opinions of Older Amer-
icans on Medicare and Health Issues, DATAGRAM (Nov. 1987) (newsletter published by Amer-
ican Association of Retired Persons); Lipton, Do-Not-Resuscitate Decisions in a Community
Hospital Implications for Quality Care, QALiTY REV. BULL., July 1987, at 226.
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mittees are mandated by federal law in the most benign and
noninvasive manner, they will still be seen by many as a front for the
rationing of health care. Already bioethics is in danger of being
characterized as a rationing procedure that discriminates against the
elderly and the poor: in Oregon and in Alameda County, Califor-
nia, a group of bioethics consultants was retained to engineer the
process whereby its novel system of Medicaid rationing was devel-
oped.24 The resulting controversy illustrated the inherently ideo-
logical nature of an official role for bioethics in the management of a
public insurance system that threatens to collapse. Many bioethical
issues are artifacts of structural arrangements for financing the
health care system 25 but ethical decisionmaking should not be used
as a cover for public officials who are reluctant to face the political
choices inherent in health care resource allocation.
This is not simply a parochial plea to keep bioethics pure-an
untenable position for an ethicist from Brooklyn. I refer also to the
more general point that ethical standards normally need not be, and
often should not be, interpolated into law. Currently in the state of
New York we are struggling to assimilate into clinical practice a law
governing cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR).26 So far as I can
tell, there is no serious disagreement with the intent of the law,
which attempts to insure that no one who wants CPR is denied it.
But problems of implementing legal requirements into hospital rou-
tine are daunting. Each year a new crop of houseofficers 27 must be
persuaded that an additional sheaf of fifteen forms is necessary to
protect hospitals from liability. Many patients suspect that authoriz-
ing a do-not-resuscitate order will result in the unwanted limitation
of other forms of treatment, and their suspicions are not ground-
less. 28 Indeed, I hope that our educational efforts will result in
greater control for patients over their destinies, but in the
meantime, my impression is that in some of our hospitals the
number of "no-codes" has actually decreased since the CPR law was
passed, and the number of "slow codes" has increased. 29
24. See Sasse, The Rationing of Health Care Services: The Case of Alameda County, Califor-
nia, 2 Hosp. ETHICS COMMITEE F. 145 (1990).
25. Examples involve the issues of terminating treatment for low birthweight infants,
and treatment of adults who have smoked excessively or who have alcohol-related
disease.
26. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-2978 (Consol. 1990).
27. "Houseofficers" refers to doctors in post-graduate training.
28. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 23, at 226.
29. A "no-code" refers to an order not to resuscitate, whereas a "slow-code" directs
staff to treat the patient slowly and let him or her slip away without documenting any
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Urging caution about ethics committees is not the same as op-
posing their formation. Still, I will be more comfortable about of-
fering counsel when more is known about them and when more
attention is paid to the circumstances that result in their formation.
In our eagerness to develop a means of addressing many of the
human problems in modem health care, let us not rush to create
more.
decision to let the patient die. In some hospitals the law has created so much bureau-
cracy that the "no-code" is not applied. The result is that patients are overtreated and
the spirit of the law is defeated.
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